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INTRODUCTION
In its simplest terms, this appeal is about whether an oral express waiver is sufficient
to waive the parties’ agreement that waiver can only occur in writing. Here, the parties
specifically agreed waiver of a contractual right can only occur if in writing by an
authorized officer of the Company (the “Unwritten-Waiver” clause). However,
Plaintiffs/Appellees (“Plaintiffs”)1 nonetheless seek to pursue claims that on their face
require the conclusion that Defendant/Appellant LifeVantage (“LifeVantage”) waived the
Unwritten-Waiver clause by an alleged oral waiver.
The relevant underlying facts are relatively simple. After Plaintiff Bradley Dixon
obtained ownership in more than one distributorship in violation of the parties’ agreement,
LifeVantage exercised its right to terminate. Plaintiffs sued, including for breach of contract
and declaratory relief, based on a theory that LifeVantage waived its right to terminate
should a distributor own more than one distributorship. They alleged waiver based on an
oral communication. LifeVantage moved to dismiss arguing the contract specifies that
waiver can only occur in a writing by an authorized officer. The trial court denied
LifeVantage’s motion based on its interpretation of two opinions of this Court: Calhoun v.
Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d 284 (Utah 1944), and Mounteer Enters., Inc. v.
Homeowners Ass’n for Colony at White Pine Canyon, 2018 UT 25, 422 P.3d 809. The trial
court found that Utah law permits an express oral waiver of an Unwritten-Waiver Clause.
This Court granted LifeVantage’s Petition For Permission to Appeal From Interlocutory

1

Plaintiffs are Bradley Dixon and an entity, Al-In Partners, LLC, that held the terminated
distributorship that is the subject of the underlying Amended Complaint. (R.00219–20.)
6

Order.
This Court’s decision in Mounteer makes clear that Utah law recognizes the parties’
freedom to determine what conduct will amount to waiver of rights under the parties’
agreement. 2018 UT 23, ¶ 19, 422 P.3d 809, 813. Mounteer states “if the specific language
of the antiwaiver clause expressly precludes parties from construing certain conduct as a
waiver of contractual rights, courts must enforce this provision as part of the parties’
agreement.” 2018 UT 23, ¶ 19. The trial court found that this Court intended Mounteer to
only apply to cases of implied waiver, and that Calhoun still stands for the proposition that
the parties cannot by contract agree on how express waiver can occur.
This Court should clarify that Mounteer applies to both express and implied waivers,
reverse the trial court’s denial of LifeVantage’s motion to dismiss, and remand to the trial
court with instructions to grant LifeVantage’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of
contract and declaratory relief claims.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issues:
(1)

Whether this Court’s decision in Mounteer Enters., Inc. v. Homeowners Ass’n
for Colony at White Pine Canyon, 2018 UT 25, 422 P.3d 809, affected or
altered the standard set forth in Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 146 P.2d
284 (Utah 1944), or whether Calhoun otherwise should be reconsidered.

(2)

Whether courts must enforce a provision of a parties’ agreement that
precludes construing express conduct as a waiver of contractual rights.

Standard of Review: Interpretation of binding case law presents a question of law,
7

which is reviewed for correctness. Utah Dept. of Transp. v. FPA West Point, LLC, 2012 UT
79, ¶ 9, 304 P.3d 810, 813.
Preservation: This issue was preserved through (a) Defendant’s March 29, 2018
Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint and the Reply thereto; (b) Defendant’s oral
argument at the May 30, 2019 hearing; and (c) the trial court’s Interlocutory Order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Facts
LifeVantage manufactures wellness products and markets and sells its products to

consumers through a network of independent distributors. (R.00221.) Each independent
distributor enters into a contractual relationship with LifeVantage by signing the
LifeVantage Distributor Application and Agreement, which incorporates the LifeVantage
Distributor Policies & Procedures (“P&Ps”). (R.00228, 00230, 00278, 00308.) In 2009, the
parties entered into such an agreement that included express provisions governing the
ownership of multiple distributorships, when LifeVantage is permitted to terminate a
distributorship, and when waiver of LifeVantage’s rights may occur. (R.00226, 00230,
00279, 00309.)2
In Section 2.6 of the P&Ps, the parties expressly agreed LifeVantage “never gives up
its right to insist on compliance with the Agreement” (the “Antiwaiver” provision) and
waiver of a contractual right can only occur in writing by an authorized officer of

2

Section 4.4 of the P&Ps prohibits a distributor from owning more than one LifeVantage
distributorship. (R.00228, 00281, 00311.) Section 14 of the P&Ps permits LifeVantage
to terminate a distributorship when a distributor has breached a provision of the P&Ps.
(R.00226, 00297–98, 00332–33.)
8

LifeVantage (the “Unwritten-Waiver” clause). (R.00279, 00309.) The Antiwaiver
provision provides:
The Company never gives up its right to insist on compliance with the
Agreement . . . . No failure of LifeVantage to exercise any right of power
under the Agreement or to insist upon strict compliance by an Independent
Distributor with any obligation or provision of the Agreement, and no custom
or practice of the parties at variance with the terms of the Agreement, shall
constitute a waiver of LifeVantage’s right to demand exact compliance with
the Agreement. . . . LifeVantage’s waiver of any particular breach by an
Independent Distributor shall not affect or impair LifeVantage’s rights with
respect to any subsequent breach . . . . Nor shall any delay or omission by
LifeVantage to exercise any right arising from a breach affect or impair
LifeVantage’s rights as to that or any subsequent breach. . . .
(R.00279, 00309.) The Unwritten-Waiver clause states:
Waiver by LifeVantage can be affected only in writing by an authorized
officer of the Company.
(R.00279, 00309.)
After agreeing to the terms of the P&Ps, Dixon obtained ownership in more than one
distributorship—Distributorships 101982 and 101987—contrary to his obligations under
Section 4.4 of the P&Ps. (R.00221–22, 00223–25.) In correspondence dated November 11,
2016, LifeVantage terminated Distributorship 101987, referencing Section 4.4 of the P&Ps,
which prohibits a distributor from owning more than one LifeVantage distributorship.
(R.00229.) Plaintiffs allege LifeVantage waived Section 4.4 of the P&Ps based on an oral
communication. (R.00230–31.)
2.

Procedural History and District Court Disposition
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on February 20, 2018, bringing claims

for declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
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and promissory estoppel. (R.00219–35.) Plaintiffs alleged LifeVantage waived its right to
enforce Section 4.4 of the P&Ps—the restriction on ownership of more than one
distributorship. (R.00230–31.) On March 29, 2019, LifeVantage filed a Motion to Dismiss
the First Amended Complaint (“Motion”),3 arguing Plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient
to support waiver because, pursuant to Section 2.6 of the P&Ps, they expressly agreed that
LifeVantage “never gives up its right to insist on compliance with the Agreement,” and,
more importantly, that waiver of a contractual right can only occur if in writing by an
authorized officer of LifeVantage. (R.00256–344.)
After the Motion was fully briefed but before oral argument, the Utah Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Mounteer. LifeVantage filed a Notice of Supplemental
Authority to bring Mounteer to the trial court’s attention. (R.00431–41.) Ruling from the
bench at the conclusion of the March 30, 2019 hearing, the trial court limited Mounteer to
cases involving implied waiver, and found that this Court’s decision in Calhoun required the
trial court to not enforce the parties’ Unwritten-Waiver clause. (R.00538–41.) The Motion
was denied as to the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims on this basis.
(R.00538–41, 00459–60.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the heart of this appeal is the question of whether parties to an agreement are free

Granting LifeVantage’s Motion in part, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel claims on grounds
unrelated to this appeal. (R.00538–42, 00459–60.) The only remaining claims—and
those subject to this appeal—are Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and declaratory
relief.

3

10

to agree when express waiver of a contractual provision can occur, or more specifically: in
Utah is an unwritten-waiver provision enforceable? It cannot be disputed that permitting
oral waiver of a provision stating waiver must occur in writing is to deem it unenforceable
and of no meaning or effect. LifeVantage asks this Court to conclude that the jurisprudence
underlying Mounteer, and the Mounteer ruling itself, recognize that, barring
unconscionability or other equitable attack, courts must enforce contracting parties’
agreements as to what conduct constitutes waiver, even in the case of express waiver.
ARGUMENT
The Parties’ agreement makes clear that LifeVantage has the right to terminate
Plaintiffs’ distributorship if two distributorships are owned. (R.00226.) The Agreement
also includes two distinct waiver provisions: (1) the Antiwaiver provision that indicates
LifeVantage never waives its ability to enforce its rights under the agreement, and (2) the
Unwritten-Waiver clause—stating that waiver by LifeVantage can only occur when in
writing by an authorized officer of the Company. (R.00279, 00309.) On its face, the
Amended Complaint does not state a claim for breach of contract or declaratory relief unless
LifeVantage can be found to have waived all three of the provisions identified above.
(R.00279, 00309.)4

4

As the underlying motion is brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, it is important to note that to prevail LifeVantage must show that, challenging
the adequacy of the Amended Complaint on its face, Plaintiffs have failed to properly state a
claim on which relief can be granted. See Archuleta v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 2009 UT 36, ¶ 5,
238 P.3d 1044. In considering such a motion, the court must accept the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations to be true, but “need not accept extrinsic facts not pleaded nor [. . .] legal
conclusions in contradiction of the pleaded facts.” Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts,
L.C., 2010 UT 29, ¶ 10, 232 P.3d 999. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may
11

It is settled Utah law that waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right,
that “[c]ourts do not lightly consider a contract provision waived,” and that the “otherwisebreaching party [must] show that the other party intentionally waived its rights under the
contract.” Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶¶ 17–18. A waiver can be express or implied from a
party’s conduct, but it must be clearly and distinctly made. Id.
Importantly, the Mounteer decision makes clear that waiver of each provision of an
agreement must be considered individually (here, the underlying provision prohibiting dual
ownership, the Antiwaiver provision, and the Unwritten-Waiver clause), and that waiver of
the underlying provision does not amount to waiver of the other two. Id. at ¶ 21 (This
heightened burden requires “a party asserting waiver in the face of an antiwaiver clause [to]
establish ‘a clear intent to waive both the [antiwaiver] clause and the underlying contract
provision.’ And this second waiver must meet the same standard as waiver of the
underlying provision—there must be an intentional relinquishment of that right.”). In other
words, if a party takes action that would amount to waiver of the underlying provision (such
as agreeing to ownership of two distributorships), the party asserting waiver must
additionally and separately show that the waiving party intentionally waived the other

“consider documents that are referred to in the complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff’s
claim, regardless of whether such documents were actually included with the complaint.”
BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ¶ 6, 322 P.3d 1172, 1174 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Thus, where a litigant references an agreement, the court is not required to
accept Plaintiffs’ pleaded interpretation of the contract as correct but instead is permitted to
look beyond the four corners of the Amended Complaint to examine the underlying contract
and interpret the same. Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ¶ 13, 104 P.3d
1226, 1231.
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provisions (the Antiwaiver and Unwritten-Waiver clauses) as well.
Citing Williston on Contracts, this Court in Mounteer noted “[a]ntiwaiver provisions
aim to give contracting parties flexibility in enforcing their rights under the contract—
enforcement that would often be to the detriment of the other party—without ‘result[ing] in
a complete and unintended loss of its contract rights if it later decides that strict performance
is desirable.’” Id. at ¶ 19 (citing 13 Williston on Contracts § 39:15 (4th ed. 2018). “So if
the specific language of the antiwaiver clause expressly precludes parties from construing
certain conduct as a waiver of contractual rights, courts must enforce this provision as part
of the parties’ agreement.” Id. Accordingly, waiver of the underlying provision alone is not
sufficient to amount to a waiver of the Unwritten-Waiver clause “because the failure to
insist on performance after breach is entirely consistent with the rights set out in the
antiwaiver provision—rights of flexibility that often benefit the otherwise breaching party[,]
. . . [a]nd a finding of waiver in such circumstances would thus render the antiwaiver
provision meaningless.” Id. at ¶ 24.5

5

Mounteer’s ruling is consistent with the constitutional right of freedom to contract, which
is both a liberty and a property right protected by due process. See Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, 31 S.Ct. 502, 516, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); see also 16B Am. Jur. 2d
Constitutional Law § 641 (same). This Court has repeatedly affirmed that “[p]ersons
dealing at arm’s length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention
of the courts for the purpose of relieving one side or the other from the effects of a bad
bargain.” Commercial Real Estate Inv., L.C. v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc., 2012 UT 49, ¶ 38,
285 P.3d 1193, 1202 (quoting Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1978)). “It is
not [the court’s] prerogative to step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties.” Id.
(quoting Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712, 717 (1958). “Instead, unless
enforcement of [the contract] would be unconscionable, [courts] should recognize and
honor the right of persons to contract freely and to make real and genuine mistakes when
dealings are at arm’s length.” Utah Transit Auth. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 2015 UT 53, ¶
31, 355 P.3d 947, 956 (quoting Commercial Real Estate Inv., 2012 UT at ¶ 38).
13

On the plain terms of Mounteer, the trial court should have granted LifeVantage’s
Motion to Dismiss because there was nothing before the court that could amount to an
intentional waiver by LifeVantage of the Unwritten-Waiver clause. (R.00219–35.)
Importantly, there is no allegation of a writing by an authorized officer of the company
indicating that LifeVantage intended to waive any of the agreement’s provisions.
(R.00219–35.)
Oral argument on LifeVantage’s motion focused on this Court’s recent decision in
Mounteer, with the trial court’s interpretation relying on a singular citation to Calhoun
(without parenthetical, reasoning or explanation) for the unremarkable proposition that
“express waiver of a contractual right is sufficient to waive both [the underlying provision
and the antiwaiver provision].”6 Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶ 23. While Mounteer was silent
on the issue, the trial court focused on the existence of an unwritten-waiver clause in
Calhoun and how the Calhoun Court ignored it when finding express waiver.7 On this basis
alone (after acknowledging that Mounteer does not mention the unwritten-waiver clause in

6

The Calhoun opinion involved a car loan. 146 P.2d 284, 285–86 (Utah 1944). The
borrower had notified the company that he expected to be inducted into the army and, in
response, the company “told [him] that he might have some time” to sell the car and get
his equity out of it. Id. Two weeks later, the company exercised its contractual right to
repossess the car after the buyer failed to sell the car or make a timely payment. Id. The
contract contained an antiwaiver provision which stated that acceptance of late payments
“shall not constitute a waiver of any other subsequent breach or default or prevent seller
from immediately pursuing any or all of its remedies.” Id. at 286. The Calhoun Court
held that the loan company expressly waived both its right to strictly enforce the payment
due dates and the antiwaiver provision by its statements. Id. at 287.
7
The Calhoun contract provided that “no waiver of or change in the terms of this contract
shall be binding . . . unless evidenced by writing signed by the parties.” However, the
Calhoun court did not meaningfully address this clause.
14

Calhoun or its enforceability in the face of an express or implied waiver), the trial court
concluded that the reasoning of Mounteer (including ¶¶ 17–22) has no application where
waiver is express, and thus an unwritten-waiver clause does not preclude oral waiver, so
long as it is express. (R.00538–41.) In its own words, the trial court explained:
I don’t have any problem with the concept that Mounteer establishes a fairly
high burden of proof for plaintiffs seeking to prove waiver of a provision and
separately to prove waiver of the antiwaiver provisions; and for that matter, in
this case, to prove waiver of the requirement that any waiver be made in
writing by an officer. That’s a high burden. But Mounteer also appears to
draw a distinction between sins of omission and sins of commission. That is
conduct where a breach is allowed to proceed versus affirmative conduct by a
party - - a contracting party that affects its rights under the contract. And it’s
for that reason I look at the paragraph citing to Calhoun, where Mounteer
leaves untouched the holding that an express waiver of one provision waives
the antiwaiver provision, as well. Doesn’t mention in Mounteer the effect on
a requirement that a waiver be made in writing. But it does cite with
Calhoun. And Calhoun actually did involve the provision that not only had
an antiwaiver provision but also a requirement that waiver be made in writing
by an officer. And Calhoun ignored that.
(R.00539–40.)
However, a reading of Mounteer demonstrates its citation to Calhoun was simply
intended to reaffirm the general law on express waivers in Utah, rather than to erase over 70
intervening years of contractual jurisprudence on which the Utah Supreme Court based its
ultimate holding in Mounteer.8 See Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶¶ 17–22. Whether express or

8

Were Calhoun considered today in light of the decades of decisions on contractual law
generally and waiver law specifically, a court would enforce the parties’ agreement as
written, requiring not only evidence of an intentional relinquishment of the underlying
provision, but also of both the anti-waiver provision and unwritten-waiver clause as this
Court articulated in Mounteer. Importantly, this Court’s decisions do not identify every
previous opinion intended to be modified thereby. Instead, Utah law is set by the most
recent opinion of this Supreme Court and all prior opinions that materially differ are no
longer controlling. See, e.g., State ex rel. Auto. Emporium v. Murchison, 289 Or. 673,
15

implied, Mounteer makes clear that Utah law recognizes the freedom to contract, including
to determine what conduct will amount to waiver of rights under the parties’ agreement. Id.
at ¶ 19. Even if the Mounteer Court intended to leave the application of contractual law as
to express waivers for another day, it is impossible to apply the same reasoning to the
Unwritten-Waiver clause here and reach a different conclusion as doing so would render the
clause meaningless, unenforceable and ignored, and the “complete and unintended loss of
[one party’s] contract rights.” Id. at ¶ 19.
Thus, under the reasoning of Mounteer, even express oral waiver of the right to
“insist on performance of an underlying provision [limiting a person to one distributorship]
is insufficient to establish the intentional relinquishment of [LifeVantage’s] rights under the
[Unwritten-Waiver clause].” Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶ 24. In other words, even assuming
LifeVantage orally waived the underlying provision or even the Unwritten-Waiver clause
itself, such an action is entirely consistent with the flexibility of rights set out in the
agreement—that waiver shall only occur if in writing by an officer of the Company. Id.
Clearly, “a finding of waiver in such circumstances would thus render the [UnwrittenWaiver clause] meaningless.” Id.; see also id. at ¶ 22 (quoting Van Bibber v. Norris, 275
Ind. 555, 419 N.E.2d 115, 121 (1981) (“[a]llowing waiver where the party has not clearly
waived the antiwaiver provision would undo [the agreement between the parties] and would
‘beg[] the question of validity of the non-waiver clause.’”)); Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor

675, 616 P.2d 496, 497 (1980) (prior opinions superseded by more recent opinion); Acme
Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N.Y. 495, 504, 109 N.E. 577, 579 (1915) (same); State v.
Adams, 144 Ohio St. 3d 429, 472, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 265, 45 N.E.3d 127, 171 (same).
To the extent Calhoun could be considered to contradict Mounteer, Mounteer controls.
16

Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 15, 210 P.3d 263 (This court “consider[s] each contract
provision . . . with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” (internal quotation
marks omitted).).
For all these reasons, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and declaratory relief claims—
which rise and fall on whether LifeVantage waived the Unwritten-Waiver clause—fail as a
matter of law.
CONCLUSION
This Court should now reverse the trial court’s denial of LifeVantage’s motion to
dismiss and, on remand, direct the trial court to enforce the parties’ agreement as written,
and grant LifeVantage’s motion to dismiss.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2020.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

/s/ Gregory M. Saylin
Gregory M. Saylin
Brittany J. Merrill
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant LifeVantage
Corporation

17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11), I certify that this brief complies with the word count
limitations of Rule 24(g) because, excluding parts of the document exempted by Rule
24(g)(2), this document contains 3597 words. I further certify that this brief complies with
the requirement of Rule 21 governing public and private records.

/s/ Gregory M. Saylin
Gregory M. Saylin (09648)
Brittany J. Merrill (16104)
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant LifeVantage
Corporation

18

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 3rd day of February, 2020, true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was sent via e-mail, with two
printed and bound copies to follow via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Frederick de B. Bostwick, III
BEARD KULTGEN BROPHY BOSTWICK & DICKSON, PLLC
220 South Fourth Street
Waco, TX 76701
bostwick@thetexasfirm.com
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
AL-In Partners, LLC and Bradley Dixon

/s/ Gregory M. Saylin
Gregory M. Saylin (09648)
Brittany J. Merrill (16104)
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant LifeVantage
Corporation

14128304_v2

19

